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Abstract
It is a widely accepted conclusion of the economic literature on optimal law enforcement that 
nonmonetary sanctions should be introduced only when fines have been used up to their maximum 
extent. In this paper it is shown that when the sanctioning policy conveys information about the 
harmfulness of the sanctioned behavior, the use of nonmonetary sanctions can be optimal even when 
the monetary fine is not maximal. The argument is formalized in a model with rational but uninformed 
individuals, who know that the enforcer has better information about the harmfulness of actions but 
are uncertain about the true objectives of the enforcer.
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1. Introduction
In order to deter individuals from engaging in harmful activities, monetary penalties are
often supplemented by nonmonetary sanctions. Since the former are simply transfers, and
therefore imply lower social costs than the latter, economists have tried to assess when and
to what extent it is optimal to use nonmonetary sanctions. It is a widely accepted conclusion
that these should be introduced only when fines have been used up to their maximum extent.1
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1 This conclusion has been formally stated by Polinsky and Shavell (1984), although we already find in Becker
(1968, p. 193) that “social welfare is increased if fines are used whenever feasible”. See also the surveys by Garoupa
(1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000a).
In this paper we argue that such a conclusion may not hold when a sanctioning policy
is intended not only to deter individuals, but also to inform them about the harmfulness of
certain activities as, in this case, nonmonetary sanctions may present some advantages over
monetary ones. We show that, when the sanctioning policy conveys information about the
possible effects of individuals’ behavior, the use of nonmonetary sanctions can be optimal
even when the monetary sanction has not been used up to its maximum extent.
Public law enforcement is motivated by the presence of externalities. However, we
observe that a relevant characteristic of certain activities (such as driving or smoking)
is that they can be harmful to the individual engaging in them, and not only to others.
Moreover, individuals may have other-regarding preferences, so that they care about the
possible effects of their activities on others. As a consequence, the belief in the riskiness
of individual activities is an important determinant of behavior. If the government knows
better than individuals how risky or harmful such activities are, sanctions can affect the
amount of harm produced not only by directly increasing the costs for the wrongdoers, but
also by modifying the individuals’ perception of the likely consequences of their actions.
The logic of our argument goes as follows. We assume rational individuals facing a better
informed enforcer whose true objectives are not known with certainty by the individuals.
If the “credibility” of the enforcer becomes a concern, it is important for a benevolent
enforcer to signal that the enforcement policy is actually aimed at deterring violations,
rather than at reaching competing objectives. Indeed, different kinds of sanctions can score
differently in this regard. Consider the case of individuals who are not sure that the enforcer
is maximizing social welfare, and believe that it has a stake in the revenue accruing from
monetary sanctions2: a high monetary sanction will not be seen as an optimal deterrence
policy in the face of a very harmful activity, but as motivated by the desire to raise revenue.3
Under these circumstances, nonmonetary sanctions may have an advantage over monetary
fines for a welfare maximizing government. The use of nonmonetary sanctions may be a
more credible signal, compared to monetary sanctions, of the enforcer’s commitment to
reducing the amount of harm produced.
Our signaling theory can rationalize the use of nonmonetary sanctions in cases where the
sanctioning policy observed is hard to reconcile with the standard conclusions on optimal
deterrence.4 Consider for instance the deterrence of driving offenses. In this case, costly
nonmonetary sanctions (e.g. license withdrawal or vehicle forfeiture) are often used together
2 In the theory of public enforcement of law, the hypothesis that government can be interested in revenue rather
than social welfare was first examined by Garoupa and Klerman (2002), who compared the optimal enforcement
policies chosen by a social welfare maximizing government and by a rent-seeking one. In a related paper, Dittmann
(2006) derives the optimal type of punishment under the assumption that the detection probability is chosen
by a rent-seeking government and shows that exclusive mandatory imprisonment for serious crimes is welfare
maximizing. Other papers that consider the possibility of a rent-seeking government are Wickelgren (2003) and
Friedman (1999).
3 A recent report on parking enforcement in London issued by the Greater London Authority Transport Commit-
tee opened claiming that “[i]n a city which has too many cars to move around or park without associated rules, we
accept restrictions and penalties—so long as their purpose is to alleviate traffic problems and not to raise revenue”
(our emphasis).
4 An alternative argument to explain the use of nonmonetary sanctions may refer to incapacitation, since a
sanction such as driving license suspension has the effect of keeping the driver from doing harm for some time.
According to Shavell (1987) it is optimal to incapacitate an individual if the per period harm he can cause exceeds
with non-maximal fines, and should we replace the prescribed nonmonetary sanctions with
a monetary sanction of equivalent value for the wrongdoer, fines would be much lower than
individual’s wealth, which according to the standard theory should represent the upper limit
of a monetary sanction.5 Other examples may be crimes related to minor copyright violations
(for instance recent reforms in the Italian law prescribe the possibility of imprisonment for
music piracy), or crimes typically committed by wealthy individuals, such as some financial
or commercial crimes.6
Note that the use of nonmonetary sanctions is even less reasonable if the upper limit to
the applicable sanction is represented by some social or ethical constraint rather than by
the wrongdoer’s wealth.7 In this case, the same upper limit would presumably apply both
to monetary and nonmonetary sanctions, and it would be equally difficult to explain why
the fine is not raised up to this maximum level and a more costly nonmonetary sanction is
used.
The paper joins a large stream of literature that qualifies Becker’s (1968) theory of
deterrence. In recent years some contributions resorted to information related arguments
(Bebchuk & Kaplow, 1992; Ben-Shahar, 1997; Garoupa, 1999), focusing on imperfect
information about the probability of detection or apprehension. To our knowledge, the
present contribution is the first to introduce imperfect information about the probability of
undesired consequences for the wrongdoers themselves, and to emphasize the role played
by nonmonetary sanctions as a signal of the harmfulness of sanctioned behaviors.8
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic hypotheses and the model
setup. Section 3 discusses the optimal sanctioning policy: we will consider the case of
perfect information (Section 3.1), compare it to that of asymmetric information (Section
3.2), and examine the possibility that an upper limit applies to the total sanction rather than
to the monetary sanction alone (Section 3.3). Section 4 summarizes and provides concluding
remarks.
the per period social cost of incapacitation, and to keep him incapacitated as long as this condition holds. However,
apart from license suspension for drunk driving or similar cases in which the necessity to reduce an impending
danger is obvious, this argument seems unable by itself to provide a rationale for the use of nonmonetary sanctions
in most of the cases we can observe.
5 Concerning driving offenses, a recent empirical study supports the idea that fines could substitute for license
suspensions without violating any individual wealth constraint: Jorgensen and Wentel-Larsen (2002) estimate that
the average willingness to pay of Norwegian car drivers to have their license back (suspended for six months) was
about 600$ in 1997.
6 As reported by Dittmann (2006), the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual provides for
mandatory imprisonment for several crimes that are expected to be committed by wealthy people. For instance:
commercial bribery if the bribe or the improper benefit to be conferred exceeds 5000$; embezzlement if the loss
exceeds 120,000$; evasion of export controls; repetitive discharge of a hazardous or toxic substance into the
environment.
7 For instance, if the penalty were defined according to the principle that the penalty should fit the crime, then
neither a fine of thousands of Euros nor imprisonment would be accepted as a sanction for double parking. The
inclusion of notions of fairness in the theory of optimal sanctioning is discussed, among others, by Polinsky and
Shavell (2000b) and Kaplow and Shavell (2001).
8 Barigozzi and Villeneuve (2006) present a similar argument about taxation. They show that taxes may have a
signaling function in situations in which the government is more informed than consumers about the consequences
of their consumption choices.
2. Model setup and hypotheses
Consider a population of identical individuals who gain a benefit b from violating a legal
rule, where b is a random variable.
The violation of the rule will cause an accident with probability q. The accident produces
an externality E and, additionally, a cost K for the wrongdoer himself. K includes liability
costs and any other negative effect of the accident that the wrongdoer internalizes, such as
a damage suffered (consider the case of a car accident where the driver or his relatives are
among the victims) or altruistic concern; note that it may be the case that K is by far the
larger component of the social cost of the accident.
2.1. Benevolent enforcer, rent-seeking enforcer and individuals’ inferences
We make the assumption that the probability q can take two possible values: high or
low (respectively qH and qL, with qL < qH). At the outset, potential wrongdoers do not
know q; they have a prior expectation r that the probability of an accident is high (qH).
However, the probability is known to the enforcer, who has access to more reliable sources
of information than individuals. It would be in the interest of the parties (enforcer and
potential wrongdoers) that this information is shared, but we assume that the enforcer
cannot produce verifiable evidence about the value of q, or it can do so only at a considerable
cost.
Even if direct communication of q is not possible, individuals can learn something about
q and update their beliefs on the risk of an accident by observing the sanctioning strategy
chosen by the enforcer. We assume that the enforcer’s objective function is not known with
certainty by the potential wrongdoers: individuals assign a positive probability to the case
that the enforcer maximizes a function which is different from the social welfare.9 For
instance, individuals may believe that with probability β the enforcer maximizes the fine
revenue R rather than social welfare.10
We label, respectively, “benevolent” an enforcer (government) that maximizes social
welfare, and “nonbenevolent” or “rent-seeking” an enforcer that maximizes fine revenue.
We want to characterize the optimal sanctioning policy of a benevolent enforcer who takes
into account the uncertainty of individuals about its objective function (i.e. about its “type”
being benevolent or rent-seeking) and about the risk of an accident.
We choose not to explicitly model the political mechanism that can induce a government
to act in a benevolent way. However, we make the assumption that the political system
is effective enough that even a nonbenevolent government could not overtly behave in a
way that reveals its type. In other words, the individuals must not be able to infer from the
9 The main reason for this assumption is that, if individuals in the population knew the objective function of the
enforcer, they would be able to overcome the information asymmetry simply by inferring the value of q from the
sanctioning policy selected by a welfare maximizing enforcer.
10 The reason why the budget R enters the objective function may be that the enforcer (the government) earns a
rent from managing public funds (the rent is assumed to be proportional to the funds). The model can be easily
extended to the case in which the enforcer is believed to maximize a function of both social welfare and fine
revenue.
behavior of the enforcer that it is nonbenevolent (though in some circumstances they may
be able to tell it apart from a benevolent enforcer). To be more precise, we assume that
(1) the nonbenevolent government cannot choose a strategy which would never be chosen
by a benevolent government; and (2) the nonbenevolent government cannot choose a low
deterrence policy when the risk of accident is high; although it can overdeter violations when
the risk is low. An explanation for assumption (2) is that with underdeterrence individuals
can detect that the government has chosen the “wrong” policy by observing a high number of
accidents; on the contrary, overdeterrence is difficult to detect, because although individuals
see that there have been high sanctions and a small number of accidents, the counterfactual
is missing, i.e. it is hard to know what the number of accident would have been with lower
deterrence.
2.2. Monetary versus nonmonetary sanctions
Let π be the probability that a wrongdoer who violates is caught. Since the cost of
detection plays no fundamental role in the model, we assume that π is exogenously given
and fixed. The model can be extended without difficulty to the case of a variable π.
In order to deter violations, the enforcer will sanction the wrongdoer using monetary
and nonmonetary sanctions. Let F be the monetary fine to be paid when the wrongdoer is
caught, and H the equivalent in money of the nonmonetary sanction.
The theory of optimal monetary sanctioning points to the wealth of individuals as an
upper bound for monetary sanctions: we have F ≤ ¯F , while H is not subject to such a
limit.11 However, we will extend our model to allow for alternative possibilities, including
customary rules constraining the maximal sanction that can be imposed for a violation: in
this case, the upper bound will be on the total amount of the sanction F + H.
As it is well known, an important difference between monetary and nonmonetary sanc-
tions is that the latter imply a social cost, while the former are simply a transfer, and therefore
the cost for those sanctioned is exactly offset by a gain for those who receive the fine revenue.
We consider that a nonmonetary sanction whose amount is H implies a social loss of δH,
with δ > 0 (if δ = 0, the nonmonetary sanction would be equivalent to a monetary transfer).
The social cost of the nonmonetary sanction includes both the cost for the wrongdoer of
being sanctioned and the net cost for the enforcer of imposing the sanction.12
Another aspect, which is relevant in our model, is that the rent-seeking enforcer has
a direct interest in increasing the fine revenue, while there is no gain from increasing a
nonmonetary sanction.
11 More precisely, even when there is a limit (e.g. the time in prison is constrained by age), the classical theory
implicitly assumes that this is higher than the optimal interior solution for the nonmonetary sanction.
12 It is worth noting that the sanction can bring about some social benefits too; for example, when we consider
driving offenses and drivers who are required to attend a course in order to have their driving license back after a
withdrawal, the course may increase the ability of the drivers, and affect the future risk of accidents: in this case,
the benefit for society corresponds to the reduction in future externalities. In addition, nonmonetary sanctions may
prevent the individual from doing harm for a certain period (this is the incapacitation argument we mentioned in
footnote 4). Of course, we rule out the possibility that these gains are higher than the total social cost of sanctions,
as in this case the imposition of the sanction would be optimal irrespective of its deterrence effect.
By mimicking the strategy of the benevolent enforcer facing q = qH, the nonbenevolent
enforcer may be able to extract a rent from individuals. It will pretend that q = qH (i.e.
that the risk of an accident is high) and set a high monetary sanction, when it is actually
q = qL. This means that a high monetary sanction does not unambiguously signal that q = qH,
since it may well be compatible with q = qL and a nonbenevolent enforcer. In other words,
the possibility that the enforcer is rent-seeking rather than benevolent makes the monetary
sanction a “noisy” signal about the riskiness of sanctioned actions. A nonmonetary sanction,
although more costly, does not suffer such a drawback.
It is worth emphasizing that it is because of the presence of K, i.e. because the accident
is costly to the wrongdoer as well, that the signaling role of sanctions is important for
deterrence.
3. Optimal sanctions
In order to analyze the optimal policy it is convenient to refer directly to the expected
sanction S = πF. ¯S = π ¯F will denote the maximum possible value of S, corresponding to
the highest possible monetary sanction ¯F .
Similarly, let N indicate the expected (equivalent monetary) value of the nonmonetary
sanction: N = πH.
Given S and N, an individual will violate the rule if
b − (S + N) − pK > 0 (1)
where p is the probability (not necessarily equal to q) that potential wrongdoers assign to





[b − q(E + K) − δN] dG(b) (2)
whereG is the cumulative distribution ofb, orG(x) = Prob{b≤ x}, with densityg. In function
U it is made explicit that deterrence (and therefore social welfare) depends on individuals’
perception of the risk incurred by violating the rules.
3.1. Perfect information
Assume that individuals are perfectly informed about q, i.e. they know the “true” prob-
ability of getting into an accident when violating a legal rule (i.e. p = qi, with i = L, H).
We first restate the standard conclusion about the optimal mix of monetary/nonmonetary
sanctions; namely, that a nonmonetary sanction should be used only to supplement a mon-
etary one when the latter has been used up to its maximum extent. In our context, this can
be expressed as follows.
Proposition 1. When p = q (perfect information), it is never optimal that at the same time
N > 0 and S < ¯S.
Proof. We simply show that if S < ¯S and N > 0, it is always possible to increase (2)
by increasing S. Consider the effect of an increase in S exactly offset in terms of deter-
rence by a decrease in N, or dN = −dS: since dN + dS = 0, the change in social welfare is
[1−G(N + S + qK)]δS > 0. 
When the probability is qi, the enforcer selects S and N to solve
max
S,N
U(S,N, qi) s.t. S ≤ ¯S. (3)
In order to align individual incentives and social costs/benefits, when the probability
is qi the optimal expected sanction Si is qiE if this level is lower than ¯S; the expected
sanction corresponds to the Pigouvian corrective tax for the externality. Consistently with
Proposition 1, the optimal expected nonmonetary sanction Ni will be zero in this case.
If the constraint on the maximum monetary sanction is binding (because qiE > ¯S), we
will have Si = ¯S and Ni is either a positive value satisfying
[qiE − (1 − δ)N − ¯S]g(N + ¯S + qiK) − δ[1 − G(N + ¯S + qiK)] = 0 (4)
or it is zero (this will be the case if the left-hand side of (4) is nonpositive for N = 0).
This corresponds to the common conclusion about the use of a nonmonetary sanction as
a supplement to a maximal monetary sanction.
In the following we will refer to the optimal solution with perfect information as the first
best solution, and we will assume that Si < ¯S (so that Ni = 0) for i = L, H.
3.2. Asymmetric information
When information about q is asymmetrically distributed, individuals update their expec-
tation on the probability of an accident by observing the sanctioning policy and considering
the possible strategies of a benevolent and a nonbenevolent enforcer. In the equilibrium,
each type of enforcer maximizes its payoff according to the expected optimal response of
the individuals in the population; and potential wrongdoers choose on the basis of their
beliefs, which are formed according to the observed behavior of the enforcers.
Consider the case in which the benevolent enforcer fixes the expected sanctions at the
perfect information levels. This strategy will result in an efficient outcome only if the
potential wrongdoers can infer the “true” risk of accident from the sanctions observed.
An individual observing a low sanction will infer that the probability is low, since by our
assumptions it is not possible for the enforcer, even if it is nonbenevolent, to choose a low
sanction when the risk is high. Therefore, when the risk is low there is no difference with
respect to the perfect information case, and the optimal sanction will be SL.
However, an individual observing S > SL might not be able to infer that the risk is high,
as the nonbenevolent enforcer might find it convenient to fix a high sanction even when the
risk is low, if it can increase its fine revenue by doing so. In other words, we might end up
with a “pooling” equilibrium where potential wrongdoers observe the same policy in the
case of a high risk and in the case of a nonbenevolent enforcer facing a low risk of accident.
In such a pooling equilibrium potential wrongdoers update their beliefs when they observe
Fig. 1. Expected monetary sanctions and frequency of violations.
S > SL but, as the enforcer may be a rent-seeking one, they are not able to know the “true”
probability q.
We indicate by p˜ the posterior belief when potential wrongdoers cannot tell apart the
case of high risk from that of a nonbenevolent enforcer, with13
qL < p˜ ≤ qH. (5)
The last inequality is strict if β (the probability that the enforcer is rent-seeking) is positive,
and the difference between p˜ and qH is higher the higher β is.
When the risk of accident is qL, by imposing the sanctions (S,N) chosen by the benevolent
enforcer when q = qH, the rent-seeking enforcer gets a payoff
R(S,N) ≡ S[1 − G(p˜K + S + N)]. (6)
Therefore, in order to give potential wrongdoers the proper signal about the riskiness of
their behavior when q = qH, the benevolent enforcer will set the sanctions so that R(S,
N) ≤RL (incentive compatibility constraint), where RL ≡ SL[1 −G(qLK + SL)] is the payoff
the rent-seeking enforcer would obtain by selecting the welfare maximizing strategy SL.
In Fig. 1 the curve drawn in a continuous line represents the total sanction corresponding
to each frequency of violation 1 −G when p = qH; the dashed curve gives the maximum
monetary sanction consistent with the incentive compatibility constraint (S = RL/(1 −G)).
13 Let p0 be the prior probability that potential wrongdoers assign to the eventuality of an accident; it is p0 = qL + r
(qH − qL) where r ∈ (0,1) is the prior probability that q = qH (see above). By simple application of Bayes’ rule,
the posterior probability is
p˜ = qL + r
r + (1 − r)β (qH − qL)
with p˜ ≥ p0, p˜ = qH for β = 0 and p˜ = p0 for β = 1.
To simplify our analysis, we will assume that the two curves cross only twice, at levels Sm
and SM (so that R(Sm, 0) = R(SM, 0) = RL), and that ˜S < SM, as depicted in the figure. This
implies that levels of sanctions higher than Sm can satisfy the constraint only if the monetary
sanction is supplemented by a nonmonetary one. Equivalently: R(S,0) > RL if Sm < S ≤ ¯S,
while R(S,0) < RL for S < Sm. Note also that SL < Sm.
If we had R(SH, 0) ≤RL, it would never be optimal for the rent-seeking enforcer to dis-
guise (the incentive compatibility constraint would be satisfied in the first best). Therefore,
in order to focus on the case in which asymmetric information affects the outcome, we
assume that R(SH, 0) > RL, or SH > Sm.
We now characterize the optimal sanctioning strategy for a benevolent enforcer faced
with a high risk of accident (q = qH). This can result in either a pooling or a separating
equilibrium. The latter is obtained by solving
max
S,N
U(S,N, qH) s.t. S ≤ ¯S, R(S,N) ≤ RL. (7)
We have a pooling equilibrium when, faced by a low risk (q = qL), the rent-seeking enforcer
mimics the benevolent enforcer’s optimal strategy for q = qH (i.e. the incentive compatibility
constraint is not satisfied); we solve in this case
max
S,N
U(S,N, p˜) s.t. S ≤ ˜S, R(S,N) > RL. (8)
We assume that (qH − p˜)K + qHE > ¯S. Since
U((qH − p˜)K + qHE, 0, p˜) = U(qHE, 0, qH), (9)
this assumption rules out the possibility that a monetary sanction alone can induce a first best
level of deterrence in the pooling equilibrium, which would make the problem uninteresting.
We summarize the solution to the above problem in
Proposition 2. Let ¯S be the upper limit on monetary sanctions. Assume that there is
asymmetric information and there is no monetary sanction inducing a ﬁrst best level of
deterrence. The problem admits a separating equilibriumwhere potential wrongdoers learn
the true probability qH. In this equilibrium we may have N > 0 even when S < ¯S. This
outcome is more likely the higher (qH − p˜)K is.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The proposition states that, due to the incentive compatibility constraint, there is a role
to be played by nonmonetary sanctions even if the monetary sanction is not maximal.
Although less costly in principle, an increase in the monetary sanction can be unadvisable
because it makes the signal about harmfulness “noisy” (the benevolent and the rent-seeking
enforcer are “pooled”), with adverse effects on deterrence. Nonmonetary sanctions, though
more costly, make it possible to increase deterrence while controlling potential wrongdoers’
beliefs about the real objective of the enforcer’s policy.
Note that (qH − p˜)K is higher the higher the own-effect of violations K is, the higher
the belief that the enforcer is rent-seeking (β) is and the higher the uncertainty about the
probability of an accident is.
3.3. Upper limit to the total sanction
Our result about the signaling role of nonmonetary sanctions extends to the case in which
the upper bound applies to the total amount of the sanction, monetary and nonmonetary,
rather than only to monetary sanctions. This is the case when the upper limit to sanctions
is not related to the wealth of individuals, but reflects some other external constraint. For
instance, the government may want to respond to some view of fairness shared by the
individuals, who believe that the sanction should “fit the crime”.14
The existence of an upper limit to the total sanction can be expressed by the constraint
F + H ≤ ¯F, or S + N ≤ ¯S. When sanctions are subject to an upper limit to the total
sanction, Proposition 1 implies that under perfect information it must always be N = 0, and
there is no role at all for nonmonetary sanctions. Hence, the conclusion that the use of
nonmonetary sanctions can be part of the optimal strategy is more striking here than in the
case considered above.
After substituting S + N ≤ ¯S for S ≤ ¯S in problems (7) and (8), we proceed as in the
previous section. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 3. Let ¯S be the upper limit on total sanctions, monetary and nonmonetary.
Assume that there is asymmetric information and there is no monetary sanction inducing a
ﬁrst best level of deterrence. The problem admits a separating equilibrium inwhich potential
wrongdoers know the true probability qH. In this equilibrium we will have S < ¯S and, in
spite of this, we may have N > 0. This outcome is more likely the higher is (qH − p˜)K is and
the lower δ is.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
With respect to Proposition 2, we have here that a low δ unambiguously makes the
separating equilibrium, the only one in which nonmonetary sanctions can be used, more
likely than the pooling equilibrium. The result seems to better suit the case of nonmonetary
sanctions with a low (though strictly positive) social cost; this is the case for sanctions that
bring about some social benefits, for example because they incapacitate or re-educate the
wrongdoer.
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we develop a signaling theory of nonmonetary sanctions. We have
incorporated educational and informative concerns into the standard theory of deter-
14 Polinsky and Shavell (2000b) consider the case of a government which responds to fairness oriented preferences
of the citizens: “When the issue of fairness is added to the analysis, however, the usual solution is generally not
optimal because a very high sanction will be seen as unfair, or more precisely, will result in the lowering of
individuals’ fairness-related utility. With respect to double parking, even a sanction of $100 might be considered
unfair, let alone a sanction of $10,000”. Our analyses differ in that, for simplicity, we take the upper limit as
a constraint in the enforcer’s objective function, rather than introducing a concern for fairness in the objective
function itself.
rence by considering a situation in which the public enforcer is better informed
than the potential wrongdoer about the possible negative consequences of viola-
tions.
The paper provides a contribution to the theory of optimal law enforcement by
showing that the traditional conclusion on the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions,
namely that fines should be used to their maximum extent before nonmonetary sanc-
tions are introduced, does not hold when the signaling power of different sanctions
is taken into account. Indeed, monetary and nonmonetary sanctions are not perfect
substitutes not only because they imply different costs, but also because they pro-
vide different signals to individuals. In particular, we have shown that nonmonetary
sanctions may be more credible in transmitting information about the harmfulness of
actions.
Finally, it is worth discussing how our analysis is affected by the availability of alter-
native means of transmitting information, whose use we have implicitly ruled out. For
instance, the government may disseminate information by means of a large scale informa-
tive campaign. However, it is clear that such a campaign should be costly to be credible;
otherwise, the (welfare maximizing) enforcer would find it optimal to save on sanctioning
and detection costs by always claiming that the risk is high, even when it is in fact low.
Given this remark, the access to relatively cheaper channels of information does not seem
to represent a compelling argument against the use of nonmonetary sanctions as a signaling
device.
Besides, it could be claimed that sanctioning is a fairly effective way to attract the
attention of the wrongdoers and be sure that the information reaches the desired target. In
this regard, using sanctions may be better than relying on the expectation that the individuals
watch TV ads or read informative booklets.15 As these actions are costly for the individuals,
they may decide not to bear these additional costs, thus making the information campaigns
ineffective.
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Appendix A
A.1. Proof of Proposition 2
First note that if in the optimum N = 0, then S = Sm. This follows from the assumption
that R(S, 0) < RL for S = Sm and from the fact that for S = SH it is ∂U(S, 0, qH)/∂S > 0. Note
that S = Sm cannot be part of an optimal strategy.
If on the other hand N > 0 and S < ¯S, then it must be R(S, N) = RL (we can prove that
R(S, N) < RL cannot be part of an optimal strategy using an argument similar to the proof of
Proposition 1). Let ϕ(S) be defined by R(S, ϕ(S) ≡RL, so that the incentive compatibility
constraint can be written as N≥ϕ(S).
If the problem has a maximum with N > 0 and S < ¯S, this will satisfy N = ϕ(S) and the
first order condition dU/dS = 0, where
dU
dS
= −(1 + ϕ′)[S + N − qHE − δN]g(S + N) − δϕ′[1 − G(S + N)]. (10)
Note that, in order to simplify notation, we have implicitly considered (and will consider
hereafter) b− qHK instead of b as the integration variable.
Finally, we might have a maximum with S = ¯S and
N∗ = arg max
N≥ϕ( ¯S)
U( ¯S,N, qH). (11)
To prove Proposition 2, we must first show that it is possible that neither Sm nor ¯S constitute
an optimal strategy. This will indeed be the case if there exists S ∈ (Sm, ¯S) such that U(S,
ϕ(S), qH) is higher than both U(Sm, 0, qH) and U( ¯S,N∗, qH). The two inequalities imply,
respectively
δϕ(S)[1 − G(S + ϕ(S))] <
∫ S+ϕ(S)
Sm
[b − qHE] dG(b) (12)
and




[b − qHE] dG(b) + δN∗[1 − G( ¯S + N∗)].
(13)
To illustrate when such conditions are likely to be satisfied, consider for instance S such
that S + ϕ(S) = SH, as in Fig. A.1. A sufficient condition for an internal solution is that the
hatched rectangle scaled by the factor δ, representing the cost of the nonmonetary sanction
N = ϕ(S), is less than each of the two shaded triangles, representing, respectively, the cost
of overdeterrence from imposing a sanction16 ¯S plus N*, and the cost of underdeterrence
from imposing only a monetary sanction Sm. Such a condition will be met if δ (the share of
16 Note that the cost of imposing the sanction N*, i.e. the last term on the right side of (13), should be added to
the cost of overdeterrence. We expect that in general this cost will be quite small: in the figure, it is represented
by the rectangle on the left of the upper triangle and above ¯S.
Fig. A.1. Cost of overdeterrence and underdeterrence.
nonmonetary sanction which represents a social loss) is sufficiently low, although nothing
excludes that it can be satisfied even when δ = 1, i.e. when the sanction is totally wasteful.
We have shown that a separating equilibrium with S < ¯S and N > 0 may exist. We now
show that it may well be preferred to the pooling equilibrium.
In the pooling equilibrium, setting S < ¯S cannot be optimal. This is easily proved con-
sidering that Proposition 1 holds without the incentive compatibility constraint, implying
N = 0; therefore S < ¯S < (qH − p¯)K + qHE implies
∂U(S, 0, p˜)
∂S
= −[S − qHE − (qH − p˜)K] > 0 (14)
which allows us to conclude that S should be set as high as possible.
Hence, the optimal nonmonetary sanction will be N** which solves17
max
N
U( ¯S,N, p˜) s.t. 0 ≤ N < ϕ( ¯S). (15)
Depending on the parameters of the model, U( ¯S,N∗∗, p˜) can be either higher or lower than
what we have in the separating equilibrium. It can be easily checked that the social welfare
in the separating equilibrium is more likely to be higher than in the pooling equilibrium the
higher (qH − p˜)K is.
In particular, a sufficient condition for the separating equilibrium to dominate the pooling
equilibrium is that
¯S < Sm + (qH − p˜)K. (16)
This is easily proved. If ¯S + N∗∗ < Sm + (qH − p˜)K, the pooling equilibrium is clearly
dominated by the separating equilibrium with Sm and N = 0 (the latter implies higher
17 Note that this problem may admit no proper optimum in the open interval 0 ≤ N < ϕ( ¯S); this may be the case
if U is increasing in N near ϕ( ¯S).
deterrence at lower cost, since only monetary sanctions are used). If on the other hand
¯S + N∗∗ < Sm + (qH − p˜)K, consider the sanction S > Sm such that
S + ϕ(S) + (qH − p˜)K = ˜S + N∗∗. (17)
The separating equilibrium with S and N = ϕ(S) > 0 yields the same level of deterrence as the
pooling equilibrium. However, since S > Sm, it follows from (16) and (17) that N** > ϕ(S);
since the frequency of violation is the same in the two cases, they differ only in the cost of
monetary sanctions, which is higher in the pooling than in the separating equilibrium.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3
This is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2. Just like in that case, N = 0 implies
S = Sm while N > 0 implies N = ϕ(S). Here, in addition, it follows that S < ¯S in the separating
equilibrium.
A separating equilibrium with N = ϕ(S) > 0 is found solving
max
S
U(S, ϕ(S), qH) s.t. S + ϕ(S) ≤ ¯S (18)
which gives the following alternatives: either S + N = ¯S and dU/dS > 0; or S + N < ¯S and
dU/dS = 0, where dU/dS is given by (10). As in the previous proof, the condition for N > 0
to be part of the optimal strategy is given by the inequality (12), which ensures that S = Sm
and N = 0 is not optimal.
Finally, the social welfare in the separating equilibrium must be compared with that of
the pooling equilibrium, which in this case (being never optimal N > 0) is U( ¯S, 0, p˜). The
condition for the optimality of the separating equilibrium is
δϕ(S)[1 − G(S + ϕ(S))] <
∫ S+ϕ(S)
¯S−(qH−p˜)K
[b − qHE] dG(b) (19)
where on the left side we have the cost of the nonmonetary sanction N = ϕ(S) and on the
right side the gain in terms of deterrence from signaling that the risk of accident is high.18
The separating equilibrium will be preferred for high values of (qH − p˜) and of K, and for
low values of δ.
We finally observe that (16) also holds in this case as a sufficient condition for the
optimality of the separating equilibrium.
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